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Abstract
This paper revisits the ability of central banks to manage private sector’s expec-
tations depending on its credibility and how this affects the use of interest rate rules
and pegs to achieve monetary policy objectives. When private agents can only provide
limited incentives for the central bank to follow a policy, we show that resulting limited
credibility allows a central bank to prevents the inflation from diverging by defaulting on
past promises if necessary. As a result, the Taylor rule, when expected, anchors inflation
expectations on a unique equilibrium path as long as the Taylor principle is satisfied.
Finally, we also show that limited credibility restricts the impact of long-term interest
rate pegs, so as to make current conditions less dependent on future policy changes.
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1 Introduction
To stabilize the economy and guarantee price stability, the central bank needs to be cred-
ible about its future moves to steer private sector’s expectations (Barro and Gordon, 1983)
and also to anchor these expectations on a single path. To this purpose, central bank may
adhere to interest-rate rules as argued by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Taylor (1993).
Such rules however allow self-fulfilling diverging inflation paths as noted by Woodford (2003)
among others, and therefore fail to anchor private sector’s expectations.1 In addition, more
sophisticated rules that restore the anchoring of private expectations may not necessarily be
credible (Cochrane, 2011).2
In this paper, we investigate the implementation of monetary policy when the central
bank’s credibility to follow a policy is potentially limited. In our framework, the central
bank’s credibility stems from the incentives resulting from private agents’ reactions in case
of a policy deviation, as, for example, in Chari and Kehoe (1990). As a result, depending
on private agents’ punishment scheme, the central bank’s credibility may be limited.3 Our
key finding is that, when private agents’ reactions only leads to limited credibility, the central
bank ultimately prefers inflation stabilization over its previously announced policy plan if
inflation diverges. In particular, if inflation diverges, the central bank is always better off
by deviating thus forcing inflation to be locally bounded in equilibrium. As a result, we
obtain that, paradoxically, limited credibility ensures the anchoring of inflation expectations
in the case where the central bank is expected to follow the Taylor rule satisfying the Taylor
principle. However, limited credibility also allows for alternative equilibria, where the central
banker is not expected to follow a Taylor rule, thus suggesting that the central banker cannot
credibly rule out the multiplicity of equilibria simply by promising to follow a policy.
In addition, we show that limited credibility has implications on unconventional monetary
policy as it also constrains the outcomes of an interest rate peg – as the ones advocated
by forward guidance policy – on current inflation. We show that under limited credibility
only short-term and permanent pegs are credible, the first result echoing Friedman (1968).
This result implies that long-term but not permanent announced policy changes, being not
1This happens even when the Taylor principle is satisfied (Taylor, 1999; Clarida et al., 1999).
2See Loisel (2009) or Atkeson et al. (2010) among others for examples of more sophisticated rules or policies.
Cochrane (2011) argues that these policies usually rely on the time-inconsistent commitment to “blow up the
economy”.
3This parallels the literature on sovereign debt that has analyzed the sustainability of sovereign debt
depending on punishment schemes (see Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Kletzer and
Wright, 2000).
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credible, do not have a contemporaneous effect on macroeconomic variables. We also show
that there is no “neo-Fisherian paradox” under limited credibility as there is no continuity
between short-run inflationary interest rate pegs as used by forward guidance and potentially
deflationary permanent pegs.4
Importantly, these two effects of limited credibility arise because of the restrictions im-
plied by limited credibility on out-of-equilibrium outcomes5 and our results hold even when
limited credibility does not constrain the optimal allocation. In contrast, when central bank
is perfectly credible, the Taylor rule cannot anchor inflation expectations –there are multi-
ple equilibria even under the Taylor principle– and the “neo-Fisherian paradox” arises for
long-term interest rate pegs.
But when is credibility limited and how is it connected to policy decisions? We identify
that credibility is limited when the cost of losing credibility on its ability to manage future
expectations – which results from the deviation from past policy promises – is smaller than
the cost of hyperinflation – that is the cost of losing the credibility of money itself.6 In that
case, when inflation is costly from the central bank’s point of view, there is an incentive for
the central bank to deviate from the inflationary policy, even at the cost of losing reputation.
As both the inability of the Taylor rule to anchor inflation expectations and the long term
inflationary effect of long interest rate pegs both rely on diverging inflation paths, there exists
in both cases a point after which inflation becomes sufficiently large so that this incentive
triggers a policy deviation. In addition, anticipating this future policy move, agents adjust
their expectations, forcing the central bank to deviate from its policy plan in advance.7
We first illustrate these mechanisms in a simple flexible price model satisfying a Fisher
equation in the case of the Taylor rule (Section 2). We assume that a time-inconsistent
central bank cannot commit to adhere to a policy plan but has reputation concerns. We
then characterize the set of sustainable equilibria as in Chari and Kehoe (1990) and study
the sustainability of Taylor rule-type policies. This allows us to study how limited credibility
affects the implementation of a particular allocation using a policy plan, by verifying that off-
4When extended infinitely, a commitment to low interest rate may push current inflation to explode. This
result has been found to be paradoxical as an infinite peg may also have the effect to decrease inflation at
lower but bounded level (the “neo-Fisherian effect”) and, in addition, this also leads to the counter-intuitive
outcome that current inflation is highly sensitive to policy changes in the very far future.
5From that perspective, our work echoes Bassetto (2005), where he studies how physical constraints restrict
policy strategies and modify the implementation of a particular policy.
6In terms of empirical counterparts, periods of high inflation as the US Great Inflation can be interpreted
as periods of lost credibility on monetary policy promises but they were not periods of hyperinflation.
7This is consistent with Cochrane (2011)’s comment that deviations are anticipated by private agents and
that there cannot be two different policies implemented at the same time.
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equilibrium reactions that guarantee such an implementation are credible. We show that in
this model diverging inflation path are not sustainable and there is a unique paths of private
agents’ beliefs that are consistent with expecting a Taylor rule.
We then extend our reasoning to a standard New Keynesian model (Section 3). We
start our investigations in perfect foresight. Our main finding is that the worst sustainable
equilibrium leads to an infinite loss for the central banker, thus making the central banker
fully credible to implement any feasible allocation. We then confirm that full credibility
makes Taylor rules satisfying the Taylor principle insufficient to ensure well-anchored inflation
expectations, as there exist multiple equilibria. But, this also means that any off-equilibrium
actions that can curb diverging inflation expectations are also sustainable,8 thus potentially
guaranteeing well-anchored inflation expectations. Finally, full credibility has not bite on
interest rate pegs that may have infinite effects on current inflation. This leads the neo-
Fisherian paradox to hold and there is no restrictions on the contemporaneous effects of
future policy changes.
This motivates to turn to situations where the central bank’s credibility is limited (Section
4). To this purpose, we focus on equilibria where the private sector coordinates on milder
punishment schemes that leads to a bounded welfare loss.9 As a result, we first show that
inflation remains bounded across all equilibria. The main reason is that unbounded inflation
would lead to infinite costs, whereas the central bank can deviate and implement a better
outcome by optimally setting its policy at each point in time.
We then apply this result to study the set of equilibria where the central bank follows a
Taylor rule. When the Taylor principle holds, this set is only composed of one equilibrium
– the zero-inflation equilibrium – in which the Taylor rule is always followed. Furthermore,
we show that there are no equilibria where the Taylor rule is followed for some periods before
shifting to a discretionary policy when inflation starts to rise: the value for the central banker
to follow a rule disappears when private agents anticipate the shift to another policy in the
future.
Yet, we also show that there exist alternative equilibria, starting with the time-consistent
8See Loisel (2009) for such a strategy using solely the interest rate instrument. See Cochrane (2011) for a
description and discussion of alternative solutions external to the New-Keynesian model.
9In our benchmark case, we focus on the time-invariant discretionary equilibrium. This assumption about
the punishment is widespread in the literature: see Kurozumi (2008), Loisel (2008), Nakata (2014) among
others. In Appendix A, we provide a game-theoretic foundation of such a punishment scheme. Our results
are robust to considering punishments where agents coordinate on the permanent liquidity trap equilibrium
described by Benhabib et al. (2001). See also Kletzer and Wright (2000) for the investigation of private agents’
coordination on punishment schemes in the context of sovereign debt.
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equilibrium in which the central bank re-optimizes its decisions at every date. Such a mul-
tiplicity does not stem for the Taylor rule itself: we show that, in none of these alternative
equilibria, private agents expect the central bank to follow a Taylor rule and that these equi-
libria would arise with any other rule. This simply results from the combination of rational
expectation by private agents and sequential rationality for the central banker: whatever the
intended rule, if private agents anticipate, for example, that the central banker discretionarily
re-optimizes its policy at every date, there is no value for the central banker to follow the
intended rule and he is forced to discretion.10
Turning to forward guidance and interest rate pegs, we show that limited credibility im-
poses an upper bound on the maximal duration of the peg, except if the peg is implemented
infinitely, in which case, inflation adjusts downward following the “neo-Fisherian effect”. This
finding has two implications: marginal policy changes in the future do not have large contem-
poraneous effects, as they are simply not credible and there is no “neo-Fisherian” paradox as
short-term and infinite pegs are disjointed sets of equilibria.
We then investigate the consequences of limited credibility in the presence of fundamental
or non-fundamental shocks.
First, in Section 5.1, we show that limited credibility still allow for many equilibria when
the Taylor principle is not satisfied. Yet, we show that limited credibility restricts this set
of equilibria and, thus, limits the potential fluctuations of inflation. More precisely, we show
that fluctuations boundaries are connected to the time-consistency of the central bank’s pref-
erences, thus bridging the identification of non-fundamental shocks in Clarida et al. (2000)
with the standard view on inflation bias and time-consistency as in Barro and Gordon (1983).
These results lead to a reinterpretation of the Taylor principle: when the Taylor principle
holds, it forces any out-of-equilibrium expectations to trigger a change in policy by the central
bank. In our model, this takes the form of an immediate shift to discretion. In contrast, when
the Taylor principle is not satisfied, multiple expectations can emerge without modifying the
incentive to follow through on the Taylor rule, thus allowing for multiplicity.
Second, in Section 5.2, we extend our reasoning to a stochastic environment where the
economy is hit by fundamental shocks. The presence of shocks do not change our conclusions,
in particular when the effects of shocks are stabilized by the Taylor rule or when shocks are
bounded.11 The only difference is that, when the Taylor rule is suboptimal or do not perfectly
10For example, in Atkeson et al. (2010), the central bank can commit to off-equilibrium deviations (See
Section 5.4 for a more detailed discussion).
11Our conclusions are also robust to standard forms of unbounded shocks as standard autoregressive pro-
cesses.
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stabilize the effects of shocks, the equilibrium policy may feature shifts to discretionary policy.
We show that these shifts are in fact stabilizing: a relaxed version of the Taylor principle holds
in that case.
Third, we discuss how are results are affected by the presence of a Zero Lower Bound (ZLB)
(Section 5.3), in which case the private agents can coordinate on the permanent liquidity trap
equilibrium as described by Benhabib et al. (2001) to punish deviations.
In the end, we argue that limited credibility is key to understand monetary policy ability
to manage inflation. Taylor rules are not per se producing multiplicity, but multiplicity is the
outcome of the agents’ perception of future central bank’s policies: if agents believe in the
implementation of the Taylor rule, they will coordinate their expectations on a unique path
of inflation. However, what ensures the anchoring of inflation expectations is only partially
Taylor rules but also the expectation that the central bank eventually cares more about
stabilizing the economy than following its rule. From the central bank’s perspective, this then
requires not to blindly follow a Taylor rule,12 but to build up the reputation to be willing to
stabilize inflation. In terms of central banks’ communication, this then implies that the central
bank emphasizes this willingness to stabilize inflation in addition to their desire to stick to
a Taylor rule, in line with the communication of many central banks that have associated
the use of rules with the objective of price stability. This also means that credible monetary
policy is sufficient to ensure well-anchored inflation expectations, even in the absence of fiscal
backing and that more complex rules or monetary procedures than the Taylor rule are not
necessary to ensure price stability (see Section 5.4 for further discussions).
Literature review Our paper is connected to several strands of the literature.
The existence of multiple equilibria consistent with the Taylor rule and the Taylor principle
is well known (Woodford, 2003; Cochrane, 2011). The literature has answered to this problem
in a number of ways.
First, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1986) or Atkeson et al. (2010)
propose to switch from an interest-rate rule to another monetary policy (money growth rule,
commodity standard, and so on) in case of excessive inflation due to the interest-rate rule.
However, as noticed by Cochrane (2011), this switch is not necessarily time-consistent. In
12This contrasts with the policy recommendation to legally constrain monetary policy to follow a Taylor
rule. It is then consistent with the recent legislation entitled Requirements for Policy Rules of the Federal
Open Market Committee, Section 2 of the Fed Oversight Reform and Modernization Act (H.R. 3189), where
the central bank can change its strategy when required by circumstances, in our case, diverging inflation
expectations.
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contrast, in our approach, we do not assume any form of commitment on central bank’s
strategies.
Second, one of the major alternative for active monetary policy is the fiscal theory of the
price level (Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994; Woodford, 1995; Sims, 2013), where the value of money
is determined by future fiscal surpluses. Yet, to ensure determinacy, fiscal policy has to be
active, thus requiring full credibility of future surpluses. Instead, our results emphasize that
active monetary policy can be sufficient to ensure inflation determinacy, even in the absence
of a commitment technology.
Third, Loisel (2009), Adao et al. (2011) or Hall and Reis (2016) have investigated alter-
native rules that respond to expectations. By responding to private agents’ expectations,
the central banker can ensure the existence of a unique allocation that does not depend on
expectations. In the case of Hall and Reis (2016), the response to expectation goes through
conducting the interest payments on central bank’s reserves. However, these rules are not
necessarily credible and will not be optimally followed through by the central banker, for
example when economic agents expect the discretionary outcome. Thus, they are comparable
to the Taylor rule under limited credibility without having the simplicity and transparency of
the Taylor rule.
Fourth, Bullard and Mitra (2002) and McCallum (2009) show that the Taylor principle
delivers a unique learnable equilibrium based on the concept of E-stability. This interpretation
of the Taylor principle based on learnability of the bounded equilibrium has been challenged
by Cochrane (2009).
Our paper is more generally connected to the literature on implementation and, in par-
ticular, to Bassetto (2005) (see also Bassetto, 2002). Using Bassetto (2005)’s wording, the
Taylor rule is a strategy that the central bank can commit to following a “Schelling-timing”.
However, such a strategy is insufficient to ensure the unique implementation and we then
consider the “Schelling-timing” in the absence of a commitment technology.
The “neo-Fisherian paradox” of the forward guidance is stated in Garc´ıa-Schmidt and
Woodford (2015) or Cochrane (2016). The solutions to these proposals have been either to
depart from rational expectations (Gabaix, 2016; Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Woodford, 2015) or use
a different equilibrium selection (Cochrane, 2013). We instead show that future policy that
triggers large suboptimal deviation in the short run are not credible under limited credibility
and does not belong to any properly defined equilibrium.
As mentioned, our paper also parallels the literature on sovereign debt sustainability.
Indeed, we identify that monetary policy implementation crucially depends on the ability by
the private sector to punish policy deviations in a similar spirit as the sovereign debt literature
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identified the impact of punishment schemes for the sustainability of sovereign debt as in Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow and Rogoff (1989) or Kletzer and Wright (2000) for the impact
of the time-consistency and the coordination of lenders in implementing punishment schemes.
The role of reputation for monetary policy was first introduced by Barro and Gordon (1983)
to study the inflation bias stemming from the desire to maintain the unemployment rate below
its natural rate. Other sources of time-inconsistency of monetary policy– that gives value to
maintain the central bank’s reputation – have been investigated as the stabilization bias. In
addition, the inflation bias has been showed to arise due to multiple frictions: the steady-state
distortion of monopolistic competition in the New Keynesian model and, among more recent
contributions, the desire to redistribute wealth in the presence of nominal contracts in Nuno
and Thomas (2017) or the inefficiently low steady state level of employment in the absence of
private insurance as in Challe (2017).
This role of reputation has been investigated by Chang (1998) and Ireland (1997) who
study the sustainability of the Friedman rule in monetary models.13 Recent research has
focused on the sustainability of the Ramsey allocation in the New-Keynesian model (see
Kurozumi, 2008; Loisel, 2008; Sunakawa, 2015, among others) or Nakata (2014) in the presence
of the ZLB. Their main result is that the Ramsey allocation is usually sustainable under
plausible calibrations. Our main contribution with respect to this literature is that we focus
on the ability of the central bank to coordinate private agents on a particular allocation using
a policy, which requires to investigate the sustainability of the whole policy strategy and not
only the sustainability of the desired allocation. Importantly, we show that limited credibility
has an impact on the implementation of monetary policy, even in the case where limited
credibility does not constrain the optimal allocation.
2 A simple model
In this section, we highlight the two key ingredients that underline most of this paper’s
results in the context of a simple flexible price model. First, limited credibility rules out
infinite levels of inflation, second, the anticipation of future deviations makes immediate
deviation desirable. The model features a Fisher equation linking private agents expectations
and nominal interest rate and a (time-inconsistent) objective function for the central bank.
13See also Abreu (1988) or Abreu et al. (1990) on repeated games and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) for
the application to the Ramsey tax model. In our context, we are able to determine the worst sustainable
equilibrium without investigating the full set of equilibria as in Abreu et al. (1990).
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The environment We consider an infinite model of inflation determination with an opti-
mizing central bank and private agents forming rational expectations. Each period is denoted
by t ∈ {0, 1, ...}.
The central bank is in charge of maintaining price stability and the anchoring of long term
inflation expectations and is free to choose the level of inflation at each date. At date t, given
private agents’ expectations about future inflation, the central bank seeks to maximize the
objective function Wt over current inflation rate pit:
Wt = −(pit − p¯i)2 −
∑
k>t
βk−t(Etpik)2,
where β is the central banker’s discount factor and p¯i > 0 measures the intensity of the
temptation to raise inflation in the short run. This objective functions is ad hoc but captures
in a simple way the short-run trade-off between maintaining anchored inflation expectations
at zero in the medium run and raising current inflation at higher level (p¯i).14
The private sector forms rational expectations about future inflation rates, hence in equi-
librium pit+1 = Etpit+1. We also assume that, in equilibrium, a Fisher equation holds:
it = Etpit+1 + r, (1)
where it denotes the date-t nominal interest, Etpit+1 the date-t expectations formed by private
agents about future inflation and r the risk-free real return.15
In the following, we are looking for situations where the central bank adheres to a Taylor
rule of the form:
it = r + φpit, (2)
where φ is a positive scalar measuring the response of the nominal interest rate to inflation.
With a commitment technology As a benchmark, let us assume that the central bank
has a commitment technology and decides at date 0 to commit to follow a Taylor rule forever.
In this case, combining equations (1) and (2) yields the following condition:
φpit = Etpit+1. (3)
14In the standard New-Keynesian model, this inflation bias derives from the steady-state distortions of mo-
nopolistic competition. See also Nuno and Thomas (2017) or Challe (2017) for alternative micro-foundations
of this bias in the presence of incomplete markets. Alternatively, the stabilization bias due to cost-push shocks
may produce the same kind of time-inconsistency.
15This equation can be micro-funded by a no-arbitrage condition when, at each date, risk-neutral households
can choose to hold government bonds yielding a risk-free nominal return it or real assets yielding a risk-free
real return r. Without loss of generality, we assume that the return of the real asset is constant.
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There is a continuum of solutions to that equation in perfect foresight indexed by the date-0
inflation rate pi0:
pit = φ
tpi0. (4)
This means that multiple equilibria emerge from following a Taylor rule when this rule is
always credible. In particular, the rule produces either zero inflation at any date or leads to
diverging inflation paths when initial inflation is different from zero.
Equilibrium definition Let us now assume that the central bank does not have a commit-
ment technology and that following a Taylor rule can only be the outcome of an equilibrium.
In particular, let us define an equilibrium in this model as a sequence of current and expected
inflation rates and nominal interest rates such that:
(i) At each date, given past histories and given private sector expectations, the central bank
maximizes over its objective function.
(ii) Given past histories, private agents form rational expectations and equation (1) holds.
The constant inflation rate pit = p¯i is an equilibrium that corresponds to the so-called
discretionary equilibrium in which the central bank maximizes its objective without internal-
izing its impact on private agents’ expectations. In such an equilibrium, the Fisher equation
implies that it = p¯i + r.
Limited credibility As agents’ behaviors can be function of past histories, the potential
set of equilibria can include more equilibria than the time-consistent discretionary one, due
to the possibility of trigger strategies as in Chari and Kehoe (1990), among others. Let us
focus on the trigger strategy, where agents stick to a policy and then shift to the discretionary
equilibrium if there was any deviation in the past.16
As a result, the incentive to deviate at date t from a particular policy leading to an inflation
path {pik}k≥t is, taking into account rational expectations:
(pit − p¯i)2 +
∑
k>t
βk−t(pik)2 ≤ 0︸︷︷︸
Deviation
+
β
1− β p¯i
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shift to discretion
. (5)
The right hand side corresponds to the discounted sum of losses when deviating. In the period
of the deviation, the central bank can freely set inflation and, thus, sets it at pit = p¯i. In any
16In general focusing on a particular trigger strategy is only a sufficient condition to be an equilibrium. This
is also a necessary condition if the “punishment” equilibrium is the worst sustainable equilibrium (see Abreu
et al., 1990), which is the case of the discretionary equilibrium in this simple context.
10
future periods, the private sector expects the central bank to set inflation under discretion,
leading inflation expectations to always equal p¯i.
Importantly, this discounted sum is bounded so that the incentive constraint for not de-
viating from a policy leads date-t loss – the left hand term of inequality (5) – to be bounded
as well.
The incentives to follow a Taylor rule Let us now investigate how the credibility
constraint (5) affects the implementation of a Taylor rule. To do so, let us substitute in (5),
the values of inflation implied by following a Taylor rule:
(φtpi0 − p¯i)2 +
∑
k>t
βk−t(φkpi0)2 ≤ β
1− β p¯i
2. (6)
To start with, in the case where initial inflation equals pi0 = 0, this inequality boils down to:
p¯i2 ≤ β
1− β p¯i
2, (7)
which is satisfied when β > 1/2, which we assume from now on. As a result, there exists
an equilibrium in which the Taylor rule is followed at every date and where inflation always
equals 0.
But what about situations where inflation is initially different from 0? In that case,
equation (6) is as follows:
(φtpi0 − p¯i)2 +
∑
k>t
βk−t(φkpi0)2 =∞, if βφ2 ≥ 1; (8)
(φtpi0 − p¯i)2 +
∑
k>t
βk−t(φkpi0)2 = (φtpi0 − p¯i)2 + φ2t βφ
2pi20
1− βφ2 , if βφ
2 < 1. (9)
As a result, there are two situations to consider depending on the value of βφ2.
When βφ2 ≥ 1, equation (5) is never satisfied as the right hand side of (5), β
1−β p¯i
2, is
bounded, thus implying that there does not exist an equilibrium where the Taylor rule is
followed and pi0 6= 0.
When βφ2 ≤ 1, equation (5) may be satisfied at least in the short run. However, as time
goes by and t increases, inflation increases as well at the rate φ. When taking the limit when
t goes to infinity, one obtains, when pi0 6= 0:
lim
t→∞
(φtpi0 − p¯i)2 + φ2t βφ
2pi20
1− βφ2 =∞. (10)
Ultimately the loss to stick to the Taylor rule becomes large and exceeds the bounded loss
obtained from deviating and sticking to discretion so that the inequality (5) does not hold in
the long run and the central bank has an incentive to deviate at some point in the future.
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In the end, when pi0 6= 0 and under the Taylor rule, there always exists a date at which
the central bank is better off deviating and, hence, the only equilibrium where the Taylor rule
is always followed is when the inflation rate is perfectly stabilized at zero.
Expectations and switch If diverging inflation expectations cannot arise due to limited
credibility constraints – the central bank preferring to deviate from its policy –, does this
necessarily rule out multiple equilibria where the Taylor rule is followed, at least in the short
run? Indeed, in the case where βφ2 < 1, the central bank does not immediately deviate from
the Taylor rule but only in the long run when the inflation rate has become sufficiently large.
One may then wonder whether there exist equilibria where the central bank follows the Taylor
rule in the short run before switching to discretion?
To answer these questions, let us elaborate further about the off-equilibrium case where
inflation becomes sufficiently large at some date t to trigger a deviation. In equilibrium, this
deviation “has to be” anticipated by private agents, who adjust their expectations at previous
dates. Let us illustrate how this affects the incentives to follow the Taylor rule at any previous
period.
When deviating at period t, the central bank sets inflation at pit = p¯i. In period t − 1,
under rational expectations, private agents perfectly anticipate that the level of inflation at
date t will be p¯i. As, in equilibrium, the Fisher equation holds, the date-t−1 nominal interest
rate it−1 has to satisfy it−1 = p¯i + r. Following the Taylor rule at that date would imply an
inflation level φpit−1 = p¯i. The central bank then compares this welfare outcome resulting
from sticking at date-t− 1 to the Taylor rule with what it can do otherwise by re-maximizing
over pit−1, given that future inflation expectations are set anyway at p¯i:
(p¯i/φ− p¯i)2 + β
1− β p¯i
2 ≥ 0 + β
1− β p¯i
2, (11)
when the Taylor principle (φ > 1) holds. As a result, the central bank has no incentives to
follow the Taylor rule in period t−1 as well: this would lead to an inflation rate of pit−1 = p¯i/φ,
while the best discretionary policy is pit−1 = p¯i and there is no cost of deviating from the Taylor
rule since private agents expectations are already anchored at p¯i for next periods.
As a result, when expecting the central bank’s future deviation, private agents reduce the
current incentives for the central bank to adhere to a Taylor rule. This then implies that
there does not exist an equilibrium outcome where the central bank follows a Taylor rule in
the short run before switching to discretion when inflation increases too much. This comes
from the very reason that central banks adhere to rules because they have a long term value.
In the end, there is only one equilibrium where the Taylor rule is always followed and this
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is when inflation is perfectly stabilized at zero. Note, however, that this does not rule out
multiple equilibria – the time-consistent discretionary outcome is also an equilibrium– but in
this alternative equilibria, another policy that the Taylor rule is expected.
This simple model illustrates the two important consequences of limited credibility. First,
diverging inflation paths incentivize the central bank to deviate from its previous policy.
Second, the expectation of deviations modifies the incentives to adhere to a rule in any previous
periods. These two ingredients lead to restrict the set of equilibria where the Taylor rule is
expected to be followed.
3 New-Keynesian model
In this section, we first describe the model, we then derive optimal monetary policies under
commitment and discretion.
3.1 Model
The private sector behavior is captured by two equations:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κyt, (NKPC)
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) , (EE)
where pit denotes date-t inflation rate, yt the output gap and it the nominal interest rate.
Parameters σ, β and κ are positive constants. The operator Et is the time-t conditional
expectation operator. The New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) describes the dynamics of
prices. The Euler equation (EE) sums up the consumer’s inter temporal consumption choice.
We introduce shocks in Section 5.2.
Welfare We suppose that date-t social welfare, Wt, can be measured by the following
quadratic loss function, Lt:
17
Wt = −Lt and Lt = 1
2
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
pi2s + λ (ys − y∗)2
]
, (12)
where the scalar y∗ is the desired level of the output gap and is referred to as the inflation
bias and the scalar λ measures the weight of output gap fluctuations in the loss function.
17Microfoundation of such a loss can be found in Woodford (2003).
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We crucially assume that the steady state of the economy is inefficient –the scalar y∗ in
the loss function measures this inefficiency– such that the optimal monetary policy is time-
inconsistent. Otherwise, rules would not be better than discretion and therefore central banker
would not need to use rules and monetary policy would be essentially trivial.
3.2 Optimal policies under commitment and discretion
In this subsection, we investigate the optimal policies when the (benevolent) central banker
can commit and when he acts under discretion.
Commitment The optimal date-t monetary policy is to maximize welfare with respect to
the entire sequence of nominal interest rate, {iτ}τ≥t, given that the allocation {piτ , yt}τ≥t
solves equations (NKPC) and (EE).
Problem 1 (Ramsey problem).
max
iτ ,τ≥t
Wt
under the constraints (NKPC) and (EE).
The Lagrangian of this problem can be written as:
L = Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ
[
1
2
(pi2τ + λ (yτ − y∗)2) + µτ (piτ − βEτpiτ+1 − κyτ )
+ νt(yτ − Eτyτ+1 + 1
σ
(iτ − Eτpiτ+1 − rnτ ))
]
.
First order conditions lead to, for any τ ≥ t,
piτ + µτ − µτ−1 = 0, (13)
λ(yτ − y∗)− κµτ = 0, (14)
where µτ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraints (NKPC) and the initial
multiplier µt−1 = 0. The presence of the lagged Lagrange multiplier, µτ−1 proves that the
optimal monetary policy is backward-looking and therefore time-inconsistent as the economy
is purely forward-looking.
Zero-inflation allocation The above allocation is history-dependent. However, inflation
and the output gap converge to zero. We call the asymptotic allocation the zero-inflation
allocation. Woodford (2003) refers to it as the timeless-perspective allocation. Such an
allocation is important since Taylor rules are supposed to implement it.
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Discretion A discretionary allocation is an allocation that, at each period t, solves the
following problem:
Problem 2 (Discretion).
max
it
Wt
under the constraints (NKPC) and (EE).
First order conditions lead to:
pit + µt = 0, (15)
λ(yt − y∗)− κµt = 0, (16)
where µt is, again, the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint (NKPC). The time-
invariant discretionary allocation is the pair of constants {pi, y} solving the problem 2. The
other discretionary allocations involve inflation paths that diverge toward +∞ or −∞ de-
pending on an arbitrary initial condition pi0:
pit − pi =
[
1 + κ
2
λ
β
]t
(pi0 − pi) (17)
3.3 Sustainable equilibrium
In this section, we first lay down some elements to define the set of sustainable equilibria.
We then define the policy strategy that we call ’following a Taylor rule’. Finally, we charac-
terize the set of sustainable equilibria in the New-Keynesian model defined in section 3 and
discuss the implications for monetary policy.
Definition of sustainable equilibrium We assume that the central banker is benevolent
and chooses sequentially his best policy to minimize the loss function, while private agents
form their expectations according to rational expectations. The actions and the timing of
the game are as follows: first, private agents form their expectations for all future periods
rationally, then, the central bank optimally sets the nominal interest rate, finally, private
agents choose the current level of consumption and inflation competitively, which results into
equations (NKPC) and (EE).18
18An underlying assumption is that private agents are all identical, anonymous and decide both prices –as
shareholders of firms– and quantities –as households.
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More precisely, we denote by the sequence ht−1 = {piτ , yτ , iτ , τ < t} the history prior to
period t. For any expectations rule f = (f0, f1...), we denote by f
t = (ft, ft+1...) the contin-
uation of the expectations rule at time t, where ft(ht−1) denotes private agents expectations
{Etpit+1, Etyt+1}.19 Similarly, we denote by σ the policy plan of the central bank and by σt
its continuation. The policy rule, σt depends on the history, ht−1 but also on private agents
expectations, {Etpit+1, Etyt+1} that are supposed observable at the time of the decision. Thus,
it = σt(ht−1, Etpit+1, Etyt+1). Finally, economic agents choose the level of the output gap and
inflation at date t as a function of economic agents expectations {Etpit+1, Etyt+1} and current
interest rate it.
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We can now describe how each decision is determined given others’ decision rule, before
presenting a formal definition of a sustainable equilibrium. We present these actions by
starting from the end of the period t.
The history induced by the continuation of the policy plan σt and continuation of expec-
tations rule f t, after an history ht−1, follows:
ht ={ht−1, . . .
. . . pit(ft(ht−1), σt(ht−1, ft(ht−1)), yt(ft(ht−1), σt(ht−1, ft(ht−1))), σt(ht−1, ft(ht−1))}, (18)
where inflation and the output gap are uniquely pinned down by equations (NKPC) and (EE).
We focus on rational expectations and therefore we suppose that expectations of agents
are always correct. Given an history ht−1 and a policy strategy σ, the continuation of the
expectations rule satisfy rational expectations:
ft(ht−1) = [pit+1(ft+1(ht), σt+1(ht, ft+1(ht)), yt+1(ft+1(ht), σt+1(ht, ft+1(ht)), (19)
where ht is induced by ht−1 following equation (18).
Finally, the policymaker chooses the continuation of the policy plan σt given an history
ht−1 and the continuation of expectations f t to maximize social welfare:
max
στ ,τ≤t
−
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
piτ (fτ (hτ−1), στ (hτ−1, fτ (hτ−1)))2 + . . .
. . . λ(yτ (fτ (hτ−1), στ (hτ−1, fτ (hτ−1)))− y∗)2
]
(20)
where hτ is induced by hτ−1 following equation (18).
This allows us to define a sustainable equilibrium as follows:
19Expectations at time t only depend on variables at time t− 1 because of the timing of the game and the
absence of shocks. In Section 5.2, these expectations also include current shocks.
20Since the first order conditions of private agents are forward-looking, inflation and the output gap will
depend on ht−1 at the equilibrium only through expectations and monetary policy.
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Definition 1. A sustainable equilibrium is a policy plan σ and the private expectations f such
that for every history ht−1:
(i) [Optimal policy] Given the private expectations f , the continuation of the policy plan σt
solves central bank’s problem (20);
(ii) [Competitive equilibrium and Rational expectations] Given the policy plan σ, the contin-
uation of expectations f t satisfies equation (19).
In particular, note that any discretionary allocation is a sustainable equilibrium. Indeed, if
agents expect the discretionary equilibrium, the central banker will optimally choose to stick
to it. This thus satisfies item (i) of the definition. In addition, private agents expectations
are correct and they fulfill equations (NKPC) and (EE). Item (ii) is thus also satisfied.
Characterizing the set of sustainable equilibria We now characterize the set of sus-
tainable equilibria along the lines of Abreu (1988) and Chari and Kehoe (1990), where any
sustainable equilibrium should deliver a better outcome than the trigger strategy consisting
of the optimal deviation from the policy plan given private agents expectations followed by
the worst equilibrium.
Before stating the result, let us define the best deviation policy. Given private agents
expectations ft and an history ht−1, the best deviation policy, σdt (ht−1, ft(ht−1)) is given by
maximizing the instantaneous social welfare with respect to it:
Udt = max
it
− [pi2t + λ(yt − y∗)2] (21)
under the constraints (NKPC) and (EE) for given expectations, ft(ht−1) = {Etpit+1, Etyt+1}.
As pointed out in Section 3.2, allocations under discretion can lead to diverging inflation
when λ > 0, in which case they imply an infinite loss. These allocations are also sustainable,
implying that the worst sustainable equilibrium necessarily triggers an infinite social loss.
Therefore, we get the trivial result that any feasible allocation is sustainable:
Proposition 1. When λ > 0, any feasible allocation satisfying (EE) and (NKPC) is the
outcome of a sustainable equilibrium.
When λ = 0, the unique sustainable allocation is the zero-inflation allocation (pit = 0 for
all t).
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
It is only when the central bank does not weight output stabilization (λ = 0) as Rogoff
(1985)’s conservative central banker that the worst equilibrium yields a bounded loss. But, at
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the same time, there is only one sustainable equilibrium that corresponds with the first best
(pit = 0 at each date t).
In the end, there is no limits to credibility that would restrict the actions of the central
bank.
3.4 Taylor rules
In what follows and to make things simple, we consider a simplified version of the Taylor
rule (Taylor, 1993):
it = φpit, (TR)
where the positive scalar φ measures the reactiveness of the nominal interest rate to inflation.
In this context, the Taylor principle corresponds to φ being larger than 1.21
To make such a rule consistent with the timing of the decisions defined above, we rewrite
the Taylor rule as a function of private agents’ expectations using the equations (NKPC) and
(EE):
it = φ
κEtyt+1 + (β + κ/σ)Etpit+1
1 + φκ/σ
. (22)
This latest equation defines a policy strategy that consists of adhering to the Taylor rule.
We say that an allocation {pit, yt, it}t is implemented by the Taylor rule when this allocation
satisfies (NKPC), (EE) and (TR) for any t.
Proposition 2. If λ > 0 and the Taylor principle is satisfied, then there exist multiple
sustainable equilibria implemented by the Taylor rule.
If λ = 0, the unique sustainable equilibrium implemented by the Taylor rule corresponds
to the zero-inflation allocation.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Proposition 2 is a direct corollary of Proposition 1. This latter proposition proves that,
when λ > 0, any strategy that implies to blow up the economy is sustainable as the worst
equilibrium leads to an infinite loss. Therefore, following through on the Taylor rule is always
credible even if it means blowing up the economy! The Taylor rule is thus consistent with
many sustainable equilibria that depend on arbitrary initial expectations. They all exhibit
diverging inflation paths and large social losses.
21See Woodford (2003) for a proof.
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On the other hand, as any central bank’s strategy is sustainable, the strategies that the
central bank may find useful to use to avoid the multiplicity resulting from the Taylor rule
are also sustainable. One example would be to follow the Taylor rule if expectations are not
inflationary and shift to Loisel (2009)’s bubble-free rule if inflation expectations are diverg-
ing.22
3.5 Neo-Fisherian paradox of forward guidance
Let us now investigate the neo-Fisherian paradox of forward guidance is affected by sus-
tainability.
More precisely, consider an allocation {pit, yt, it}t≥0 satisfying equations (NKPC) and (EE)
at each date t and such that it follows an interest rate peg to a low interest rate ilow < 0 from
date 0 to date T − 1 and then verifies a Taylor rule satisfying the Taylor principle afterward.
We restrict attention to situations where, at date T , economic agents coordinate on the zero
inflation equilibrium23. For exposition purpose, we do not consider any deflationary shock
that could have motivated such policy strategy to focus on the impact of the peg. We refer
to each of these allocations as the T-period peg allocation. When the peg holds indefinitely,
the corresponding allocation is the ∞-period peg allocation
The neo-Fisherian paradox of forward guidance is that the initial level of inflation in the
T-period peg allocation, pi0, monotonously diverges to +∞ when T tends to +∞, while the
infinite peg may yield a bounded level of inflation, pi∞−peg = ilow < 0.
Proposition 3. For any T < ∞ and for T = ∞, the T-period peg allocation is an outcome
of a sustainable equilibrium if and if λ > 0 <.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
When the punishment is potentially infinite, any allocation is sustainable and, thus sus-
tainability has no bite on the neo-Fisherian effect and does not help much to clarify the
neo-Fisherian paradox of forward guidance.
In the end, when agents can infinitely punish central banks, any feasible allocation is
sustainable. As a result, the Taylor rule is not sufficient to ensure determinacy – but, any
policy that may restore inflation determinacy is also sustainable – and forward guidance
22In richer environments, such strategies may include alternative tools as fiscal ones, under the assumption
that the preferences of the authority in charge of these other tools are aligned with the central bank’s ones.
23This restriction is standard in the literature even if other allocations exist. When introducing limited
credibility, such a restriction will become unnecessary.
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policies face the neo-Fisherian paradox. Such a result highly relies on the punishment scheme
that agents are coordinating on and also has the consequence to inflict them an infinite loss. In
the following, we investigate how milder punishment schemes that provide limited incentives
– and, thus, limited credibility – for the central bank to follow through on past promises affect
these two benchmark results.
4 Limited credibility
In this section, we first introduce limited credibility by assuming that private agents coor-
dinate on a milder punishment scheme. We then characterize the set of sustainable equilibrium
and show that limited credibility implies that inflation remains bounded. We then apply this
result to investigate the set of sustainable equilibria with Taylor rules – as we did in Section 2
in the case of flexible prices – and to the equilibrium outcomes when the central bank follows
an interest rate peg.
4.1 Milder punishment schemes
The generic outcome that any feasible equilibrium is sustainable directly derives from
the infinite loss in the worst equilibrium. If, instead, one thinks that the central banker’s
credibility is limited, the punishment by the private agents, in case of a deviation, should
be milder and bounded. In particular, this can be obtained when agents coordinate on the
time-invariant discretionary equilibrium, as such an equilibrium yields a positive but finite
loss.
Assumption 1 (Limited credibility). In case of a deviation, agents coordinate on the time-
invariant discretionary equilibrium to punish the central banker.
In the appendix, we provide a micro-foundation for such a coordination, based on the
idea that private agents’ punishment in case of a deviation should not hurt too much private
agents themselves i.e. should be consistent with potential renegotiation of private agents.24
There are, of course, alternative ways to produce limited credibility, e.g. punishment with
finite length as (Loisel, 2008).
24This assumption actually parallels the literature in sovereign debt where in addition to lack of commitment
on the borrower’s side as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) or Bulow and Rogoff (1989), one can consider the
problem of commitment of lenders to follow through on punishments as in Kletzer and Wright (2000). Note
that renegotiation on punishment schemes in monetary models has been evoked by Nakata (2014).
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This assumption on the punishment scheme leads to define Limited Credibility equilibria
(or, to make it short LC-equilibria).
Definition 2. An allocation, i.e. a sequence {pit, yt, it}t≥0, is the outcome of a LC-equilibrium
if and only if (i) it solves equations (NKPC) and (EE) where expectations are replaced by
realized values (ii) for every t, the following inequality holds:
−
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
pi2s + λ (ys − y∗)2
] ≥ Udt + βWD. (SUST)
In equation (SUST), the left-hand-side infinite sum corresponds to the date-t welfare
evaluated along the allocation. The first right-hand-side member corresponds to the best
instantaneous welfare given expectations consistent with the date-t+1 allocation and the
second member corresponds to the welfare in the time-invariant discretionary equilibrium.
In the case of a conservative central banker (λ = 0), the set of sustainable equilibria as
previously defined and the set of LC-equilibria coincide and boil down to a unique allocation
(pit = 0, for all period t).
4.2 Some properties of LC-equilibria
Let us now investigate how the constraint (SUST) restricts the set of allocations. In
particular, let us show that limited credibility rules out diverging nominal paths:
Proposition 4. In a LC-equilibrium, inflation is bounded.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
The main, and simple, intuition of proposition 4’s result is that unbounded inflation leads
to very low levels of welfare, which ultimately fall well below the level of welfare in a discre-
tionary equilibrium. As a result, the central bank always optimally deviates from sticking to
a diverging-inflation allocation. In the end, proposition 4 implies that inflation should remain
bounded. This result is important since the multiplicity of allocations consistent with a Taylor
rule that we found in Section 3.4 is based on allocations that exhibit diverging inflation path.
Zero-inflation allocation The loss associated with the zero-inflation allocation is y∗/(1−
β). This loss has to be compared with the best deviation which is given by equation (21)
and the loss under the time-invariant discretionary allocation. This leads to the following
proposition:
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Proposition 5. The zero-inflation allocation is the outcome of a LC-equilibrium if and only
if the following condition is satisfied:
1
1− β ≤
κ2
κ2 + λ
+ κ2
β
1− β
λ+ κ2
(κ2 + λ(1− β))2 . (SUST-TP)
Proof. This Proposition is a direct application of definition 2.
This condition is trivially satisfied when the weight on the output gap is 0 (λ = 0). If there
is no inflation-output gap trade-off, the central banker finds always desirable to fully stabilize
inflation and the zero-inflation allocation is the outcome of a LC-equilibrium. Conversely,
when the weight λ is infinite, as output gap stabilization around the target, y∗, has infinitely
more weight than inflation stabilization, the zero-inflation allocation is not a LC-equilibrium.
In the rest of the paper, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. Condition (SUST-TP) is satisfied.
Given our previous discussion, this corresponds to a range of intermediate values for the
weight λ that is put on the output gap stabilization objective. Assumption 2 involves no loss
of generality: when this assumption is not satisfied, the allocation implemented by the Taylor
rule is simply not a LC-equilibrium. This assumption is also motivated by the literature
on the impact of limited credibility on the optimal allocation. Kurozumi (2008) and Loisel
(2008) have shown that, under plausible calibrations and using the discretionary equilibrium
as a punishment, the optimal allocation is sustainable in normal times and Nakata (2014)
extended this result to the case of liquidity traps and forward guidance.
4.3 Taylor rules
Let us now investigate whether the Taylor rule is sufficient to determine the inflation rate
when credibility is limited. To this purpose, we are looking for equilibria where the policy
instrument it is set following a Taylor rule, at least for some periods. Our main finding is that
the Taylor principle - nominal interest rate has to respond more than one for one to changes
in inflation - is sufficient to ensure inflation determinacy. We examine to what extent limited
credibility restrict the set of equilibria outside the Taylor principle in subsection 5.1.
We are interested not only in equilibria in which the Taylor rule is always followed but
also in those consistent with the Taylor rule in the short run but not in the long run. We
denote by the integer τ the date of a switch from the Taylor rule to the discretionary policy.
The following proposition states this subsection’s main result:
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Proposition 6. The Taylor principle ensures that there exist only two LC-equilibria consistent
with a Taylor rule strategy under limited credibility:
(i) the discretionary equilibrium (τ = 0),
(ii) the zero-inflation allocation (τ =∞).
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
First, Proposition 6 shows that there exists a unique LC-sustainable equilibrium imple-
mented by the Taylor rule, and this is the zero-inflation allcoation. The proof goes as follows.
Suppose that there exists another allocation implemented by the Taylor rule. In particular,
such an allocation features some inflation different from 0 in some period. Without loss of
generality, such inflation rate can be assumed to be positive. Then, because of the Taylor
principle, this implies that inflation should rise in the future and, more specifically, the infla-
tion rate should even diverge to infinity. In turn, this implies that the central banker is better
off deviating from the Taylor rule at some finite date in the future. Such an allocation is thus
not sustainable.
Second, Proposition 6 proves that there does not exist equilibria featuring Taylor rule only
in the short run under limited credibility. When the Taylor principle is satisfied, inflation is
non-zero only when some inflation is expected in the future, eventually leading the central
bank to switch from the Taylor rule to the discretionary policy at some point.
Yet, when such a move is anticipated, the central banker has any incentives to switch
earlier. As a result, by backward induction, the central bank never follows the Taylor rule. In
the end, there exist only two equilibria: in the first one the Taylor rule is always followed by
the central bank, in the second one the central bank always adopts the discretionary monetary
policy.
Proposition 6 shows that if there is multiplicity of equilibria it is not because the Taylor
rule leads to multiple equilibria but instead because economic agents can coordinate their
expectations on the discretionary equilibrium.
Cochrane (2011) argues that policy switch in the future in case of diverging inflation path
does not prevent the equilibrium to exist. We instead argue that the threat to switch to
more optimal monetary policy in case of diverging inflation path can prevent the formation
of such a trajectory. Indeed, the expectations of a policy deviation makes desirable to switch
immediately, and therefore, if agents believe in the Taylor rule in the first place they should
not coordinate on non-zero inflation trajectories.
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In the end, if the central banker’s credibility is limited, thus preventing costly off-equilibrium
reaction by the central banker, the diverging inflation paths consistent with the Taylor rule
are also not sustainable and, thus, there exists a unique equilibrium in which the Taylor rule
is always followed by the central banker.
4.4 Neo-Fisherian paradox of forward guidance
We now reconsider the paradox explained in section 3.5 under limited credibility. Indeed,
Proposition 4 shows that explosive trajectories due to too-low-for-too-long interest rates do
not exist because it is not credible to follow through on such a promise.
Proposition 7. There exists a maximal duration of forward guidance, T¯ , compatible with a
LC-equilibrium (for finite T ).
If T < T¯ , the T-period peg allocation is the outcome of a LC-equilibrium and the initial
level of inflation pi0 increases with T but is below some thresholds p¯i.
If T =∞, the low inflation rate allocation pi = ilow is the outcome of a LC-equilibrium if
and only if ilow is sufficiently close to 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.6.
This proposition shows that the puzzling discontinuity between long forward guidance
that triggers infinite inflation while a permanent interest rate shift is consistent with stable
inflation disappears when introducing limited credibility as, ultimately, forward guidance is
not credible anymore. This leads to a clear dichotomy: either the central banker engages
in a one-for-all monetary policy change (an infinite peg) or a transitory forward guidance
with a limited duration. In addition, according to Proposition 7, there is a point after which
any further extension of an already long forward guidance has no effect on contemporaneous
inflation. Third, a central bank cannot set a policy rate lower than i¯ forever.
5 Extensions
In this section, we investigate the consequences of limited credibility when enriching our
environment. First, we consider how limited credibility affects the multiplicity of equilibrium
when the Taylor principle is not satisfied. Second, we extend our results to the presence of
shocks. Third, we investigate how the zero lower bound may affect our results.
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5.1 Limited credibility outside the Taylor principle
In this subsection, we investigate how limited credibility modifies the equilibrium outcome
when the central bank is expected to follow a Taylor rule that does not satisfy the Taylor
principle. In this case, it is well known that the inflation rate is not determinate. Yet, we
show that limited credibility limits inflation.
Proposition 8. When the Taylor principle is not satisfied (φ < 1), there exist many sustain-
able equilibria consistent with a Taylor rule strategy under limited credibility:
(i) the discretionary equilibrium (τ = 0),
(ii) the zero-inflation allocation (τ =∞),
(iii) self-fulfilling prophecies equilibrium (τ =∞) described as follows:
pit = λ
t
1pi0, and yt = λ
t
1ωpi0,
where the initial level of inflation pi0 is any scalar in [pi, p¯i], the scalar λ1 is the stable
eigenvalue of the three-equation system and the scalar ω denotes the relative weight of
the associated eigenvector to the output gap (see Appendix C.7 for formal definitions).
Furthermore, the upper (lower) bound for inflation p¯i (pi) increases (resp. decreases) with the
inflation bias y∗.
Proof. See Appendix C.7.
First, let us suppose that economic agents anticipate that the central banker follows the
Taylor rule, in this case we know that there exist many equilibria that depend on a free
parameter. We index each equilibrium by the initial level of inflation pi0. Limited credibility
rules out two types of equilibria, those with a diverging inflation path –in which inflation
and the output gap belong to the unstable eigenvector– and those with a too high inflation
initial level –with a too large pi0. The zero-inflation allocation belongs to the set of sustainable
equilibria, but because of the failure of the Taylor principle many other equilibria coexist.
Second, there is no equilibria featuring a Taylor rule in the short run but not in the long
run. Interestingly, this result does not depend on the Taylor principle in a deterministic
environment. Suppose that the Taylor principle is not satisfied. If private agents form ex-
pectations that lead to inflation consistent with a sustainable level of inflation p¯i0 ∈ [pi, p¯i] in
period 0, then inflation converges toward zero. Along this trajectory, the central bank adheres
to the Taylor rule and has no incentives to deviate from it. However, if they form expectations
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outside this admissible bracket or if they put a weight on the explosive eigenvalue, then the
central bank optimally deviates immediately at date 0 and never stick to the Taylor rule.
Third, the range of fluctuations of inflation depends on the inflation bias. Indeed, the
social welfare in the worst equilibrium increases with this bias, so the higher the bias, the
more the bias the more costly the abandon from the Taylor rule is, making higher expectations
sustainable. As far as we know, this is the first time such a connection is established. This
result suggests that adhering to the Taylor principle is more crucial when the policymaker
suffers from a high level of time-inconsistency, but is less crucial when the policymaker is more
conservative.
If we reinterpret the results by Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) on
the Great Inflation in the US through the lens of this result, the large volatility of inflation
in the 70s may have reflected both a departure from the Taylor principle and a significant
inflation bias. Without inflation bias, the Fed would have departed from the Taylor rule to
discretion and inflation would have been more stable.
5.2 Stochastic environment
This section extends our results to a stochastic environment and we investigate whether
shocks can modify the results of our benchmark analysis. Our main result is that, under
various conditions (bounded shocks or certain unbounded shocks), our results go through
as the distance between the punishment equilibrium and any other equilibria has to remain
bounded, thus ruling out self-fulfilling paths of diverging inflation.
We incorporate shocks into the baseline model as follows:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κyt + ut, (NKPC)
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 − rnt ) , (EE)
where the random processes ut and r
n
t denote cost-push shocks and natural interest rate
shocks respectively. Besides, we assume that the central banker can arbitrary deviate from
the Taylor rule as follows:
it = αpit + t, (23)
where t is a monetary policy shock.
LC-equilibrium in a stochastic environment The timing is modified to take into ac-
count the stochastic property of the game. We now assume that the current shocks are known
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by private agents and by the central bank at each stage of the game. Thus expectations that
they form as well as the policy plans implemented by the central bank are functions of these
shocks. We also assume that private agents form expectations that are correct in average.
More formally, we define a sustainable equilibrium in such an environment by including shocks
in the state space, ht−1 = {piτ , yτ , iτ , uτ , rnτ , τ , τ < t} and assume that the right-hand-side
member of equation (19) is replaced by an integral over all future shocks. We now define
LC-equilibrium in such an environment.
The presence of shocks implies fluctuations in the time-invariant discretionary equilibrium.
If shocks are bounded then the punishment equilibrium is bounded as well and so is any LC-
equilibrium, thus implying that all our previous results still hold. We extend this result to
certain situations where shocks are unbounded:
Proposition 9. The distance between inflation in any LC-equilibrium and inflation in the
time-invariant discretionary equilibrium remains bounded if:
(i) Shocks are bounded.
(ii) Shocks follow a first-order autoregressive process with second-order process innovation.25
Proof. See Appendix C.8.
In the following, we apply this result to validate the robustness of our benchmark results.
Taylor principle and the ’divine coincidence’ If the natural interest rate shock, rnt ,
is the only shock affecting the economy and is incorporated in the Taylor rule (as suggested
by Woodford, 2003; Gali, 2008) then propositions 6 is not modified. The Taylor principle
guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium as long as economic agents believe in the Taylor
rule in the first place. Indeed, if the interest rate reacts by one-for-one to the natural interest
rate shock, this latter shock disappears from the economy and no more affects inflation and
the output gap.26
25Formally, this embeds any autoregressive process such that: xt = ρxt−1 + νt with ρ < 1, Etνt+1 = 0 and
Et|νt+1|2 <∞.
26If the Taylor principle is not satisfied, sunspot shocks can hit the economy:
[pit yt]
′ = V1w1,t, where w1,t+1 = λ1w1,t + ηt+1, (24)
where w1,0 corresponds to an (arbitrary) initial condition and the stochastic process ηt+1 is any bounded
zero-mean process, sometimes referred to as sunspot shocks. In the existing literature, the variance and the
support of this shock is unbounded. Limited credibility imposes the boundedness of sunspot shocks (as in
Proposition ??).
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Suboptimal Taylor rules If the Taylor rule does not respond to the natural rate of interest
rnt , if the economy is hit by a cost-push shock ut or if monetary policy deviates from the Taylor
rule, then large shocks can generate an incentive for policy switching, the Taylor rule being
suboptimal compared to the discretionary equilibrium (or the best deviation policy).
For simplicity, we suppose all shocks to be i.i.d. and zero-mean. We also assume that the
variance of shocks is small compared to the inflation bias y∗. This latter assumption guarantees
that the Taylor rule delivers a higher expected welfare relative to the one delivered by the
time-invariant discretionary equilibrium. If this assumption is not verified, the Taylor rule
will never be implemented in a LC-equilibrium.
Proposition 10. If shocks (rn, u, ) are not too large, the Taylor principle guarantees that
there exists a unique LC-equilibrium implemented by the Taylor rule.
Proof. See Appendix C.9.
If shocks are not too large, central banker always prefers sticking to the Taylor rule and
the Taylor rule implements a LC-equilibrium. Proposition 10 does not depend on the nature
of shocks as the three kind of shocks we consider lead to some inefficiency of the Taylor rule.
On the contrary, when shocks are too large, then deviating from the Taylor rule policy
triggers a short-term gain that dominates the long term gains of adhering to it and achieving
the zero-inflation allocation (compared to the time-invariant discretionary allocation). The
presence of large shocks may lead to allocations that are implemented by a Taylor rule in the
short run but not in the long run. We now investigate the impact of such large shocks ex
ante.
To simplify the exposition, we only assume large monetary policy shocks. Consider an
economy in which monetary policy follows a Taylor rule (as long as it is optimal) that can be
affected by a very large (positive or negative) monetary policy shock. This is a shortcut for...
We assume that the monetary policy shock is either 0 with probability (1 − p) or  (−)
with probability p/2 (p/2). We also assume that the size of the shock  is so large that it
always leads the central banker to switch to discretion.
Proposition 11. There exists a threshold p¯, such that:
If p < p¯, there exists a unique LC-equilibrium implemented by the Taylor rule (as long as
the economy is not affected by the shock) if and only if the adjusted taylor principle φ > 1− p
is verified. When the monetary policy shock is zero, inflation and the output gap increase with
p because of the anticipation of the inflation bias in the discretionary equilibrium.
If p > p¯, the Taylor rule is never followed by the central banker.
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Proof. See Appendix C.10.
The higher the probability of a large shock, the less incentives the central banker has
to stick to the Taylor rule. There exists a thresholds, p¯, such that when the probability of
large shocks is above the threshold p¯, the central banker never follows the Taylor rule. There
are two reasons: first, inflation and the output gap are closer and closer to the discretionary
allocation when p increases, second the long-term gains of the Taylor rule decreases with p (it
is as if the discount factor of the central banker is lower).
5.3 Taylor rule and the zero lower bound
Introducing a zero lower bound on nominal interest rate potentially introduces more equi-
libria in the game that we have studied. In particular, the permanent liquidity trap situation
as discussed by Benhabib et al. (2001) may be a sustainable equilibrium. Importantly, this
equilibrium corresponds to a finite loss (see Appendix B), and so, our results on the time-
invariant discretionary equilibrium can be extended to the case where private agents punish
the central banker by coordinating their expectations on those compatible with the permanent
liquidity trap.
5.4 More complex rules
In this subsection, we discuss two types of policies put forward in the literature to anchor
inflation expectations at a unique level: first, bubble-free rules that incorporate private agents’
expectations to disconnect these expectations and the current level of the economy Loisel
(2009),27 second, sophisticated rules that integrate a policy switch in case of inflation diverging
(Woodford, 2003, for a short review).28 Under full credibility, these more complex rules
succeed in implementing a unique equilibrium by committing to blow up the economy when
economic agents form diverging expectations. However, they fail when credibility is limited.
Under limited credibility, off-equilibrium outcomes of such policies are not necessarily
credible and this may lead to multiple equilibria. In particular, when economic agents expect
that inflation and the output gap will be at their time-invariant discretionary counterparts,
27More precisely, Loisel (2009) put forward rules like: it = r
n
t + Etpit+1 + ψpit + 1/σEt(yt+1 − yt), where
the parameter ψ is positive while Adao et al. (2011) advocate for rules like: Rt =
ξt
Et
βuC (t+1)
Pt+1
, where ξt is
an exogenous variable and uC is the marginal utility of consumption in a non-linear setting. For a related
proposal, see also Hall and Reis (2016).
28Atkeson et al. (2010) for instance argue that if inflation diverges from the target, the central bank can
switch to a money-based rule to stabilize inflation.
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then the central banker has any incentives not to follow the complex rule (either the bubble-
free or the sophisticated rule) but rather to immediately choose the discretionary policy. As a
result these more complex rules suffer from the same problem that the Taylor rule as identified
in this paper and therefore there is no gains to adhere to these more complex rules compared
to standard Taylor rule, which is – at least – simple to define and verify.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have revisited the implementation of monetary policy in the new Key-
nesian model. Our main result is that limited credibility paradoxically allows to ensure the
anchoring of inflation expectations when a Taylor rule is expected to be implemented. In
addition, limited credibility reduces the effectiveness of forward guidance as it restricts the
possible interest rate pegs that can be implemented – thus solving the neo-Fisherian paradox.
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A Renegociation
Proposition 1 stems from the ability of private agents to commit to punish harshly the central banker in
case of a deviation. Yet, such a punishment comes at their own expense. Conversely, there exist equilibria
where private agents do not trust the central banker but where the society welfare remains bounded (e.g.
the time-invariant discretionary equilibrium). As a result, taking into account private agents’ own time-
inconsistency and their desire to renegotiate (in a similar spirit as Kletzer and Wright, 2000, for the case of
sovereign debt) is very likely to alter Proposition 1. In this section, we allow such a renegotiation to take
place and show that it provides a micro-foundation for the LC-equilibrium definition (definition 2).
Setting. We enrich the model so as to let households coordinate their expectations once the central banker
has implemented his policy. We however restrict the set of renegotiation to forbid coordination on a Pareto
dominated equilibrium or an equilibrium involving time-inconsistency. The new timing of the game is as
follows:
(i) In the beginning of the period, given the policy plan, σ, private agents form expectations that satisfy
rational expectations, ft(σ, ht−1);
(ii) The central banker implements optimal monetary policy by setting it taking ft as given;
(iii) If the central banker deviates from the initial plan, private agents coordinate their expectations on the
worst equilibrium, f˜t+1 = f
W ;
(iv) Private agents choose whether to renegotiate. Either they stick to their past expectations (ft+1 or f˜t+1)
or they decide to coordinate their expectations on the best time-consistent allocation f¯t+1.
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Steps (i) to (iii) describe the standard game supporting the definition of a sustainable equilibrium. We add
a renegotiation step at the end of the period. Step (iv) is a relatively conservative departure from the standard
case without renegotiation. Suppose that in step (iii), economic agents coordinate on the worst equilibrium.
Then it can be Pareto improving to renegotiate to avoid inflecting themselves too harsh punishment. We
restrict the renegotiation set to allocations that prevent the central banker to deviate in the future. This
restriction can be interpreted in two different ways.
First, agents internalize that if they choose an allocation that will lead the central banker to re-optimize
at each period, they prevent themselves from punishing the central banker in case of deviation, indirectly
pushing him to renege on past promises too often. Second, this restriction captures the idea that it is unlikely
that (i) private agents accept to negotiate with the central banker if this latter has already defaulting on his
promises (ii) the central banker accepts to negotiate if private agents change their expectations.30
More formally, we denote by the set S the set of renegotiation. S consists of all sustainable equilibria
satisfying:
−Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
pi2s + λ (ys − y∗)2
]
= Udt + βEtWt+1, (25)
29Note that this is equivalent to having some kind of Walrasian auctioneer that will make an offer to the
rest of the private agents, who will always agree as they are homogeneous.
30Such an assumption is equivalent to the central banker punishing the private sector if they reset their
expectations.
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where Wt+1 denotes the continuation value. This condition can be simplified as follows:
−
[
pi2t + λ (yt − y∗)2
]
= Udt . (26)
All the discretionary equilibria and the constant deflation equilibrium are in the set S. In particular, as
among the discretionary equilibria, there exists an equilibrium implying an infinite loss, this means that the
S contains an equilibrium achieving the worst outcome.
This results into the following definition:
Definition 3 (Renegotiation-proof equilibrium). A renegotiation-proof equilibrium is a policy rule σ and
private agents expectations f that satisfy conditions (i) to (iv).
Characterization of the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria. Let us characterize the set
of renegotiation-proof equilibria:
Proposition 12. The worst renegotiation-proof equilibrium is the time-invariant discretionary equilibrium.
A sequence {pit, yt, it}t≥0 is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium if and only if (i) it satisfies rational
expectations (ii) for every t, the following inequality holds:
−Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
pi2s + λ (ys − y∗)2
]
≥ Udt + βEtW dt+1. (27)
Proof. Let us first consider the worst renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
Suppose that there exists a worse equilibrium than the time-invariant discretionary one. In this case
private agents should renegotiate in step (iv) and coordinate on the time-invariant discretionary equilibrium.
Knowing this ex ante, private agents should immediately choose expectations consistent with the time-invariant
discretionary equilibrium. Besides, this equilibrium is renegotiation-proof (no reason to deviate for the central
banker in step (iii) as well as for private agents in step (iv)). Therefore the discretionary equilibrium is the
worst renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
Since the worst equilibrium is the discretionary one, if the central banker deviates the maximal punishment
is the discretionary one. Thus, step (iv) can be introduced in step (iii), by assuming that private agents
coordinate on the discretionary equilibrium in case of central banker default. Therefore, the sustainability
constraint is (27).
Note that, the deflationary equilibrium and the deflation spiral are not renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
In other words, the zero lower bound cannot be self-fulfilling as long as economic agents can renegotiate.
B Loss in the permanent liquidity trap.
We now suppose that monetary policy faces a lower bound: it ≥ −i¯, with i¯ > 0. The permanent liquidity
trap is a pair of steady-state output gap and inflation (y, pi) solving the following model:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κyt and yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(−i¯− Etpit+1) (28)
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The resulting per period loss is:
i¯2 +
(
1− β
κ
i¯+ y∗
)2
<∞. (29)
As this loss is constant over time, the total welfare loss in a permanent liquidity trap is also bounded:
1
1− β
(
i¯2 +
(
1− β
κ
i¯+ y∗
)2)
<∞. (30)
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Case λ > 0. Let us first show that there exists an allocation satisfying (EE), (NKPC) and the first-order
conditions of the discretionary problem (15) and (16) that yields an infinite loss. As the allocation solves the
policy problem under discretion, it is also time-consistent and sustainable.
By manipulating the equations, we can write yt and pit as functions of Etpit+1 and of the time-invariant
discretionary allocation (y, pi):
yt − y = − λβ
λ+ κ2
Et(pit+1 − pi), (31)
pit − pi = κβ
λ+ κ2
Et(pit+1 − pi). (32)
Thus, there exist a continuum of allocations solving these equations that can be indexed by date-0 inflation
pi0:
pit − pi =
(
λ+ κ2
λβ
)t
(pi0 − pi). (33)
We can then write date-0 loss:
W0 = (1 +
κ2
λ2
)
∑
t
βtpi2t = (1 +
κ2
λ2
)
∑
t
βt
[
(pit − pi)2 + 2pi(pit − pi) + pi2
]
. (34)
Since (λ+κ
2)2
λ2β > 1, the first member of the sum diverges toward ∞ and dominates the other members.
Finally, one can obtain the Proposition’s result by considering the strategy where agents coordinate on one of
the diverging discretionary equilibrium in case of a policy deviation.
Case λ = 0. In this case, the discretionary outcome leads to pit = 0 at each date 0, which is the first-best
allocation. Let us now show that there are no other sustainable equilibria.
Let us consider an allocation that yields a different loss from 0 and let us assume that it is the outcome of a
sustainable equilibrium. This implies that there exists a period τ where piτ 6= 0. Then, given the same private
sector expectation, there exists a policy strategy that yields a strictly better outcome by setting inflation at
0 at every date, thus contradicting that the allocation is consistent with a sustainable equilibrium.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
We denote by A(φ) the 2-matrix that links current and expected variables when the central banker follows
a Taylor rule:
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 Etpit+1
Etyt+1
 = A(φ)
 pit
yt
 , (35)
where A(φ) is defined as follows:
A(φ) =
 1/β −κ/β
φ/σ − 1/(σβ) κ/(σβ) + 1
 , (36)
When the central bank follows a Taylor rule satisfying the Taylor principle, the matrix A(φ) has two
unstable eigenvalues. There exists a unique stable allocation pit = 0 and many unstable allocations that
can be all expressed as a function of initial conditions (y0, pi0) (Woodford, 2003). All these allocations are
sustainable if and only if λ > 0 because of Proposition 1.
If λ = 0, then the unique sustainable allocation is the zero-inflation allocation. This allocation does not
contradict the Taylor rule in equilibrium; thus the unique sustainable equilibrium implemented by the Taylor
rule corresponds to the zero-inflation allocation.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 is a direct application of Proposition 1. For any finite T <∞, the loss associated with the
T-period peg allocation is finite and feasible, therefore it is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium if λ > 0.
However, if λ = 0, such an allocation is not the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium. Similarly, the∞-period
peg allocation is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium if and if λ > 0.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4.
Let assume that there exists a LC-equilibrium for which inflation is not bounded, i.e. for a certain date
τ+1 inflation piτ+1 is above a scalar M > 0 that can be as large as we want. We now consider the sustainability
condition at date τ :
Lτ > pi
2
τ + λ(yτ − y∗)2 + β(pi2τ+1 + λ(yτ+1 − y∗)2), (37)
where Lτ is the social loss at period τ induced by the sustainable equilibrium with unbounded inflation path.
On the right hand side of the inequality, the sum of the first two terms is greater than Udτ , the loss given the
best deviation at period τ . Furthermore, since piτ+1 is very large the last two terms of the inequality may lead
to a very high loss, and especially above the one generated by the time-invariant discretionary equilibrium.
Thus:
Lτ > U
d
τ + βW
d
τ+1. (38)
Finally, this proves that the unbounded inflation path is inconsistent with a sustainable equilibrium.
Intuition: When the central banker anticipates a very high level of inflation next period, he is better off
by deviating immediately since the worst equilibrium triggers a finite loss.
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C.5 Proof of Proposition 6.
First, let us note that the zero-inflation allocation where pit = yt = 0 at each date t satisfies (NKPC),
(EE) and (TR) which is sustainable by Assumption 2.
Now, consider another allocation consistent with (NKPC), (EE) and (TR). This means that there exists
a date t at which the inflation rate differs from 0 (there is no loss of generality to focus on pit as we can make
the same reasoning with yt and note that either pit or pit+1 should then differs from 0). We can easily rewrite
all variables after this date as a product of the power of an unstable matrix times the level of inflation and
output gap at time t:  Etpit+k
Etyt+k
 = A(φ)k
 pit
yt
 ,
where A(φ) is the matrix defined in equation (36). As the Taylor principle is satisfied, all eigenvalues of A(φ)
are unstable, and therefore a non zero inflation level at time t leads to diverging trajectory for the output
gap and inflation. All trajectories that lead to an infinite level of inflation are not sustainable. Thus such
allocations are not the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium.
Short-run Taylor rules. Suppose that there exists a date τ at which the central bank switches from
the Taylor rule to the discretionary policy. As a result, Eτ−1piτ and Eτ−1yτ are equal to the values under
discretion and central bank have any incentives to switch to the discretionary equilibrium at date τ − 1. By
backward induction down to the initial date, the central bank switches to discretion at date 0. Therefore,
there does not exist any LC-equilibrium implemented by the Taylor rule in the short run but not in the long
run.
C.6 Proof of Proposition 7.
We denote by T , the duration of the peg. For all t ≤ T , the central banker sets the policy instrument
at a low level, iT = ilow < 0, and for t > T , the central banker follows a Taylor rule (satisfying the Taylor
principle).
If T is finite, the unique allocation from a T+1 perspective that is an outcome of a sustainable equilibrium
is the zero-inflation allocation (see Proposition 6). Therefore for any date t from 0 to T , the economy is
described by the following dynamic system: pit
yt
 = A(0)−1
 Etpit+k
Etyt+k
+Dilow,
Thus,
 pi0
y0
 = (I −A(0)−1)−1(I − [A(0)−1]T+1)Dilow. (39)
Because the nominal interest rate does not respond to inflation during the peg the matrix A(0)−1 has
one eigenvalue above and the other below 1. Therefore, pi0 diverges to +∞ when T tends to +∞. Indeed,
[A(0)−1]T+1 explodes with T and all the coefficients of matrix A(0)−1 are positive while those of D are
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negative. So there exists an upper bound on T , T¯ such that if the duration of the peg is above this threshold
the allocation is not the outcome of a LC-equilibrium.
However, it is easy to see that the allocation pit = ilow for any t is the outcome of a LC-equilibrium if the
peg lasts forever and if ilow is sufficiently close to zero (otherwise inflation is too low and the central banker
prefers deviating from this policy plan).
C.7 Proof of Proposition 8.
Let suppose that the Taylor rule is always satisfied. Then, following previous subsection, we can write
the model as follows:  Etpit+1
Etyt+1
 = A(φ)
 pit
yt
 .
When the Taylor principle is not verified there is one eigenvalue lower than one and one above one, we
call them λ1 < 0 (associated with the vector V1) and λ2 > 0 (associated with the vector V2) respectively. We
thus can decompose [pit yt]
′ = V1w1,t + V2w2,t where:
Etwi,t+1 = λiwi,t.
Therefore, using the argument developed in the proof C.5, we see that to be a LC-equilibrium one might
impose w2,t = 0. Therefore, all the LC-equilibria consistent with a Taylor rule which does not satisfy the
Taylor principle satisfy:
[pit yt]
′ = V1w1,t, where w1,t+1 = λ1w1,t. (40)
We can index each equilibrium by the initial (arbitrary) condition pi0 = V11pi0, where V11 is the first
member of the column vector V1. Thus,
pit = λ
tpi0.
In addition, since yt = V12w1,t = V12λ
t
1w1,0 =
V12
V11
λt1pi0, i.e.
yt = λ
tωpi0, with ω =
V12
V11
.
However, such an allocation is the outcome of a LC-equilibrium if and only if the initial condition pi0 is
not too large (see Proposition 4).
The role of the inflation bias. Let suppose that the initial level of inflation is pi0 and the level of
output gap is y0 =
V12
V11
pi0. This is a situation in which the economy converges to the zero-inflation allocation.
The maximal and minimal values for inflation correspond to levels of inflation such that the sustainability
constraint (equation (SUST)) is exactly binding.
∞∑
t=0
βt[pi2t + λ(yt − y∗)2] = [
λκ
λ+ κ2
y∗ +
λβ
λ+ κ2
pi1]
2 + λ[
λ
λ+ κ2
y∗ − κβ
λ+ κ2
pi1 − y∗]2 + β
1− βW
d,
40
where W d denotes the loss under discretion. One can replace pit = λ
t
1pi0 in this expression and find a quadratic
equation in y∗ and pi0:
api20 + bpi0y
∗ + cy∗2 = 0,
If the inflation bias is absent, then pi0 is necessarily zero as well and the minimum and maximum levels of
inflation are zero as well. Otherwise, we can divide this quadratic equation by y∗2 and we find a quadratic
polynomial in pi0/y
∗. First, Assumption 2 guarantees that if pi0 is zero the path is sustainable, this translates
into c < 0. Second, after some computations we can prove that a is always positive (this is consistent with
Proposition 4 that shows that inflation is always bounded in a sustainable equilibrium). Indeed, coefficient a
is as follows:
a =
1
1− βλ21
[
1 + λ
(
V12
V11
)2]
− λ21λβ,
which is positive. Thus, pi0/y
∗ satisfies a quadratic polynomial which is negative in 0 and tends to +∞ for
very large and negative values. The quadratic polynomial has two roots of opposite signs that we denote by
x1 < 0 and x2 > 0. Consequently, the lower and upper bounds (pi and p¯i) satisfy:
pi = x1y
∗ and p¯i = x2y∗
Therefore, the upper and the lower bounds for inflation are directly proportional to the inflation bias.
C.8 Proof of Proposition 9.
Let first show that if shocks are bounded, inflation is bounded in any LC-equilibrium. Suppose that there
exists an allocation with a very large level of inflation at date t. This high level of inflation is either associated
with a high output gap or high inflation expectations.
First case: high inflation expectations. Since the shocks are bounded, the loss under the time-
invariant discretionary allocation is bounded as well. If inflation expectations are really high they thus imply
a loss that dominates the loss under the time-invariant discretionary allocation which is impossible since it is
the worst LC-equilibrium.
Second case: high output gap and low inflation expectations. If inflation expectations
are low, the best deviation policy triggers a mild loss while the current loss is very high; the central banker
has thus any incentives to deviate (even if the continuation value of the loss is zero).
In the two cases, the allocation with unbounded inflation path is not the outcome of a LC-equilibrium.
We now deal with the AR(1) with L-2 innovations shocks. It is easy to see that under this assumption
the loss under the time-invariant discretionary policy is bounded. Therefore, we can apply the exact same
reasoning than before.
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C.9 Proof of Proposition 10.
Because shocks are i.i.d. and zero mean expected inflation and output gap are zero if the central bank
follows a Taylor rule forever. Consequently, we get
piTRt =
1
1 + ακ/σ
(ut − κ/σ(t − rnt )), (41)
yTRt =
1
1 + ακ/σ
(−α/σut − 1/σ(t − rnt )). (42)
(43)
While inflation and the output gap under the best deviation policy are:
piBDt =
λκ
κ2 + λ
(y∗ + ut/κ), (44)
yBDt − y∗ = −κ/σpit. (45)
(46)
Furthermore, an allocation implemented by the Taylor rule is a LC-equilibrium if and only if:
[piTRt ]
2 + λ(yTRt − y∗)2 + βLTR ≤ [piBDt ]2 + λ(yBDt − y∗)2 + βLBD, (47)
where LTR and LBD are the losses associated with the allocation implemented by the Taylor rule policy
while and the time-invariant discretionary equilibrium respectively. Since shocks are i.i.d. these losses are
independent of realized shocks at date t.
Finally to prove Proposition 10, we simply need to prove that (47) is verified for small shocks. This can
be proved by continuity. When the variance of shocks tends to zero and the size of the current shock tends
to zero as well this inequality converges toward the inequality ensuring that the zero-inflation allocation is a
LC-equilibrium.
One can remark that as if we suppose small variance of shocks, then this inequality is violated as soon as
one of the three shocks is too large. For the monetary policy shock and the natural rate of interest shock this
is trivial since the right-hand-side of the inequality is unaffected by these shocks while the right-hand-side first
two members increase with the size of these shocks. For the cost-push shock, one can use a Taylor expansion
to show that the left-hand-side members diverge more quickly than the right-hand-side toward +∞.
C.10 Proof of Proposition 11.
When the monetary policy shock is zero, equations (NKPC) and (EE) are modified as follows:
pit = β(1− p)pit+1 + βpp¯iD + κyt, (48)
yt = (1− p)yt+1 + (1− p)y¯D − 1/σ(φpit − (1− p)pit+1 − pp¯iD), (49)
where variables pit and yt denote the sequence of inflation and the output gap in the absence of shocks at date
t, scalars p¯iD and y¯D denote the average inflation and output-gap in the discretionary allocation in case of
non-zero monetary policy shock.
We can remark that all forward-looking variables are multiplied by (1 − p) so all the eigenvalues of the
dynamic system are multiplied by (1−p). The dynamic system is unstable if and only if the lowest eigenvalue
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is largest than 1 thus the economy diverges for any non-zero initial conditions (absent of shocks) if and only
if φ > 1− p.
In addition, the unique stable solution is given by: pit
yt
 = [I −A(1− p)]−1Ap
 κ
1
 λy∗
λ+ κ2
(50)
We can observe that an increase in the probability of large shock increases inflation and the output gap
(even in absence of shocks) through private agents’ expectations. It also reduces long-term gains to follow the
Taylor rule because the probability of following it decreases with p.
Therefore, there exists a probability p¯ such that following a Taylor rule –even in the absence of contempo-
raneous shock– is always suboptimal. The central banker never follows the Taylor rule when the probability
p is above this threshold.
The higher the probability of a large shock, the less incentives the central banker has to stick to the Taylor
rule. There exists a thresholds, p¯, such that when the probability of large shocks is above the threshold p¯, the
central banker never follows the Taylor rule. There are two reasons: first, inflation and the output gap are
closer and closer to the discretionary allocation when p increases, second the long-term gains of the Taylor
rule decreases with p (it is as if the discount factor of the central banker is lower).
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